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Thailand is a major net agricultural exporter and its agricultural trade policy is dominated by this 
fact. The list of agricultural exports includes many of the most important agricultural products 
produced and consumed within the country, including the staple food, rice — exports of which 
account for between 30 and 50 percent of its total output — and also cassava, sugar, rubber and 
poultry products. The list of imported agricultural commodities is much thinner. Maize was a net 
export in most years but it was a net import for some years in the 1990s. Soybeans was a net 
export for several decades, but since the early 1990s it has been a net import. Palmoil fluctuated 
between a net import and a net export but since the late 1990s it has been a net export.  
Historically, Thailand’s large agricultural surplus led to a degree of policy complacency 
regarding the agricultural sector. Agricultural-importing countries are typically concerned about 
food security and raising agricultural productivity to reduce import dependence. In Thailand, 
these matters were not a significant concern, although stabilizing food prices for consumers has 
been a recurrent theme of agricultural pricing policy. Until the 1980s, agricultural exports were 
viewed as a source of revenue for the central government. Unlike manufacturing, traditional 
agriculture was not seen as a dynamic sector of the economy which could contribute to rapid 
growth. Because the price elasticity of supply of most agricultural products was very low, at least 
in the short run, it was perceived that their production could be taxed heavily without producing 
a significant contraction of output. Moreover, most agricultural producers were impoverished, 
poorly educated and politically unorganized. This was particularly the case for rice producers, so 
taxing agriculture, and especially rice, was politically attractive and rice exports were indeed 
taxed until 1986 (Siamwalla, Setboonsarng and Patamasiriwat 1993). 
With greatly increased incomes per person, rapid urbanization and the move to more 
democratic political institutions, policy shifted away from taxing agriculture, towards a more 
neutral set of trade policies. This change almost certainly owed more to politics — the political   2
necessity of finding ways to attract the support of the huge rural electorate and the desire of the 
urban electorate for better economic conditions for the farm population — than to a desire to 
liberalize agricultural trade for the efficiency-based reasons that economists emphasize. But the 
move away from taxing agriculture has not progressed far in the direction of subsidizing it. This 
is for one key reason: the fact that so many of the important agricultural commodities are net 
exports has made subsidizing agriculture problematic, inhibiting what would otherwise have 
been strong political pressure to protect Thai farmers had the commodities they produced been 
competing with imports and hence able to be protected by imposing tariffs.  
Thailand is an active member of the Cairns Group of agricultural-exporting countries 
within the WTO membership, but while its agricultural trade is relatively liberal, it cannot be 
described as a free-trading country with regard to agricultural commodities. Within Thailand, 
opposition to agricultural import liberalization is strong in the cases of soybeans, palmoil, rubber, 
rice and sugar. Protective measures employed include non-tariff instruments, which permits a 
high degree of discretion on the part of government officials. The set of import controls includes 
import prohibitions, strict licensing arrangements, local content rules and requirement for special 
case-by-case approval of imports. The commodities for which these restrictions are applied 
include the five mentioned above and also onions, garlic, potatoes, pepper, tea, raw silk, maize, 
coconut products and coffee. 
The inclusion of rice in this list of protected commodities may seem strange. Thailand is 
the world’s largest exporter of rice and is undoubtedly one of the world’s most efficient 
producers. Why should its rice industry require protection from imports? Imports of rice are in 
fact prohibited unless specifically approved by the Ministry of Commerce. The Ministry of 
Agriculture and Cooperatives vigorously opposes any liberalization commitments with regard to 
rice. The reasons apparently relate to the Ministry’s wish to keep its options open with respect to 
rice policy in the event that market conditions should change unexpectedly. Sudden changes in 
the price of rice can have far-reaching political consequences. The domestic rice market operates 
almost entirely without government intervention, but the instruments for potential intervention 
are ever ready.  
A lesser reason for the import controls on rice is that, as with most agricultural 
commodities, ‘rice’ is in fact a highly differentiated commodity. Not all grades of rice are 
produced efficiently within Thailand and the government wishes to protect domestic producers   3
from imports of grades of rice that are closer substitutes for local grades on the consumption side 
than they are on the production side. Lower grades of rice produced in Vietnam, but not in 
Thailand, are an important example.  
Thailand’s “general exclusion list”, which applies to the ASEAN Free Trade Area 
(AFTA) agreements, includes several agricultural industries, among them are rice, sugar, and 
palmoil (both crude and refined). Within Thai government circles, discussion of the problems of 
the agricultural sector relates overwhelmingly to the treatment of Thai exports by others. 
Thailand’s own agricultural import policy is a closed issue. Problems have been encountered 
with a number of trading partners with respect to environmental and sanitary and phytosanitary 
(SPS) issues concerning Thailand’s agricultural exports. These problems have included the well-
known dispute with the United States regarding shrimp (environmental issues) and with 
Australia regarding Thailand’s exports of frozen, cooked chicken (SPS issues). 
Within Thailand, poverty is heavily concentrated in rural areas and public opinion favors 
government support for the rural poor. Since the economic crisis of 1997–98, and especially 
during the government of Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra (2001-2006), a wide range of 
income support programs, cash grants to villages, and subsidized credit schemes have been 
introduced. Support for these schemes was a significant component of the ‘populist’ economic 
policy agenda of the Thaksin government. However, few if any of these schemes operated 
through the prices faced by agricultural producers. Since they were not linked directly to the 
production of agricultural commodities, it seems that they were not ‘distorting’ in terms of 
resource allocation. The results of the present study make it possible to assess whether the price 
incentives facing agricultural producers were indeed ‘distorted’ relative to international prices 
during this period of populist government. 
The following section of the chapter briefly describes the changing structure of the Thai 
economy, especially concerning the agricultural sector. The core of the analysis, contained in the 
next section, uses price comparisons between domestic and international prices of major 
agricultural commodities and fertilizer, and relates the price comparisons to tariff and non-tariff 
barriers for these same products. It focuses on the question of whether relative prices for traded 
commodities at the wholesale level have differed from their relative border prices, adjusted for 
transport and handling costs. The next section extends this analysis to the farm level. The raw 
commodities produced by farmers generally do not enter international trade directly. These raw   4
commodities are inputs into production of the processed commodities which actually enter 
international trade. For example, rice produced at the farm level (paddy) must be milled before it 
can be traded internationally. Rice milling, transport, packaging and storage are all costly 
activities and several steps in the marketing chain intervene between the farmer and the 
international market. This raises the controversial question of how protection of the processed 
commodities (such as milled rice), observed at the wholesale level, as captured by the price 
comparisons, affects the prices actually received by farmers (such as paddy). We analyze this 
issue econometrically using Thai price data and derive from this the imputed rates of protection 
for farm-produced commodities. The final section concludes with a discussion of the future 
prospects for agricultural trade policy in Thailand. 
 
 
Economic growth and structural change 
 
 
Over almost four decades, from 1968 to 2005, Thailand’s economic output grew in real terms at 
an average annual rate of 6.5 percent. The broad characteristics of this growth are summarized in 
Table 1 and Appendix Figure A1. For ease of comparison with other Asian economies, the table 
distinguishes between the ‘pre-boom’ two decade period ending in 1986 and the following 
‘boom’ decade, which preceded the Asian crisis of 1997-99. As the table shows, Thailand’s 
growth rate during the boom decade was 9.5 percent, the fastest in the world and almost half as 
rapid again as during the two decades. Output contracted during the ‘crisis’ years of 1997 to 
1999. During the subsequent ‘recovery’ period, growth has averaged a moderate 5.1 percent. 
As is typical of rapidly growing economies, agricultural output grew more slowly than 
GDP, implying a declining share of agriculture in aggregate output (Appendix Figure A2). The 
agricultural sector accounted for 32 percent of GDP in 1965. By 2004 this share had declined to 
10 percent. Over the same period the GDP share of industry rose from 23 to 43 and the share of 
services grew from 45 to 47 percent. Part of this long term contraction is explained by declining 
terms of trade for Thailand’s agricultural exports (Appendix Figure A3).  
For more detailed study of the changing composition of the agricultural sector it is 
convenient to use the input-output tables, which are available at five yearly intervals from 1975   5
to 2000. Over this period, value added in paddy production (unmilled rice as produced at the 
farm level) declined from 38 to 26 percent of total agricultural value added (Table 2). Changes in 
the distribution of expenditures as incomes increased explain most of this change. As incomes 
rise, expenditure on starchy staples typically declines as a share of total expenditures. The share 
of maize and cassava similarly declined, but the shares of fruits, poultry, cattle and rubber 
increased.  
For almost all agricultural commodities, the share of intermediate input use in the value 
of total output increased significantly over the two and a half decades since 1975 (Appendix 
Table A1). In paddy production, for example, this share increased from 14 to 30 percent. For the 
entire agricultural sector, this cost share rose from 21 to 37 percent over the same period. Most 
intermediate goods used in Thai agriculture are domestically produced, but the share of imports 
in total intermediate input use increased from 10 to 17 percent (Appendix Table A2).  
There have been substantial changes in the pattern of sales of agricultural products. In 
1975, sales of agricultural products to intermediate users (millers and processors) accounted for 
57 percent of total sales, but by 2000 these sales had increased to 70 percent. Almost all paddy is 
milled into edible rice commercially, rather than on-farm. Paddy is neither exported nor 
imported, but milled rice has historically been an important export item, as has refined sugar. 
Cassava is similarly exported in the form of processed animal feeds. Rubber exports have 
become increasingly significant since the 1990s. Soybeans (included in ‘other crops’ in these 
tables) has become an important net import and is used for processed foods and for animal feed 




The changing structure of assistance at the wholesale level 
 
 
In their definitive study of agricultural price policy in Thailand up to the mid-1980s, Siamwalla 
and Setboonsarng (1989 and 1991) make the point that policies for the various agricultural 
commodities were determined individually, in response to political circumstances which varied 
                                                 
1 A full description of the trading position of the major agricultural commodities is provided in the data provided in 
the Appendix.   6
among the commodities concerned, rather than as a part of a single, integrated agricultural policy 
strategy. For this reason, they argue that it is best to consider the main commodities one at a 
time, which they do for the commodities rice, sugar, maize and rubber. The discussion which 
follows will also adopt this strategy, except that the range of agricultural commodities considered 
includes cassava, soybeans and palmoil, in addition to the four reviewed by Siamwalla and 
Setboonsarng. Our analysis also considers a major input, urea fertilizer. Following this 
commodity-specific review, we turn to the issue of what common themes, if any, can be found 
for Thai agricultural policy as a whole. 
The main focus of the present study’s methodology (Anderson et al. 2008) is on 
government-imposed distortions that create a gap between domestic prices and what they would 
be under free markets. Since it is not possible to understand the characteristics of agricultural 
development with a sectoral view alone, the project’s methodology not only estimates the effects 
of direct agricultural policy measures but it also includes estimates of distortions in non-
agricultural tradable sectors for comparative evaluation. Specifically, Nominal Rates of 
Assistance (NRAs) for farmers are computed, including an adjustment for direct interventions on 
tradable inputs such as fertilizer.
2 It also generates NRAs for nonagricultural tradables for use 
with that for agricultural tradables to calculate a Relative Rate of Assistance (RRA).  
The analysis is conducted at the wholesale level, so in what follows the ‘domestic price’ 
means the domestic wholesale price. In the calculation of the NRAs, the border prices are 
amended by the transport and handling costs involved in getting imports from the cif level to the 
domestic wholesale level and in getting exports from the domestic wholesale level to the fob 
level. These transport and handling costs are summarized in Appendix Table A7. This 
adjustment is required to obtain prices comparable with domestic wholesale prices. The border 
prices adjusted by transport and handling costs are then interpreted as indications of what the 




                                                 
2 The price variables and the formula used in these NRA calculations are summarized in Appendix Table A6. All of 
the annual price data are included in the Appendix also.   7
From the end of World War II to 1986, Thailand taxed its exports of rice. There were four 
individual instruments of export taxation, each with different legal foundations, and each under 
the control of different parts of the bureaucracy. The revenues the different instruments 
generated went to different destinations within the government. Siamwalla and Setboonsarng 
(1989 and 1991) describe these differences and point out that their combined effect was a rate of 
export taxation of around 40 percent from the late 1950s to the early 1970s. The rate increased to 
around 60 percent during the commodity price boom of 1972–74, but subsequently diminished 
quickly to about 20 percent. There was a further peak of about 40 percent, at the time of the 
second OPEC oil price shock in 1979–80, and then a steady decline until all four forms of tax 
were suspended in 1986. Rice exports have remained untaxed for the two decades since then.
3  
The implications of these events for actual prices are summarized in Figure 1(a), based 
on the data assembled in Appendix Table A8. As with each similar figure to be presented below 
for other agricultural commodities, the figure compares domestic wholesale prices with border 
prices for commodities of comparable quality. Since rice is a net export, “border price” in the 
diagram means export price, adjusted for transport and handling costs between the wholesale and 
export level. The NRP calculations that emerge are similar to those that would be inferred from 
the rates of taxation described above, except that the NRPs after 1986 are not zero, but average 
around -6 percent. It is possible that the transport and handling costs between the wholesale and 
fob locations are not fully accounted for in the data shown in Appendix Table A7. For rice, the 
data shown in Figure 1(a) support the view that the domestic market has received zero protection 




Maize was a net export item for Thailand until the 1990s. In 1992 and again from 1995 to 2000, 
imports dominated, but maize has subsequently reverted to being a net export good. Between 
1965 and 1981 the government intervened in the export market in an effort to preserve 
Thailand’s exports to Japan and Taiwan, primarily for use as animal feed. For both of these 
                                                 
3 The economic effects of Thailand’s rice export tax, including its distributional effects, are explored in Warr 
(2001). See also the analyses by Pinthong (1977, 1984), Wong (1978), Meenaphant (1981), Barker and Herdt 
(1985), Roumasset and Setboonsarng (1988), Somporn and Poapongsakorn (1995), Warr and Wollmer (1997) and 
Choeun, Godo and Hayami (2005).   8
markets, season-long stability of supply was required. To ensure fulfillment of contracts intended 
to ensure this stability, the government imposed quota restrictions on exports to markets other 
than these two countries. The effects of this policy included an increase in the price volatility 
passed on to the domestic producer, and somewhat reduced average earnings. As countries closer 
to Thailand, including Malaysia and Singapore, developed their own livestock industries, the 
need to preserve the Japanese and Taiwan markets was seen as being less crucial and by 1981 the 
export controls were removed. The data shown in Figure 1(b), based on the data assembled in 
Appendix Table A9, indicate roughly zero protection for the maize industry, and this outcome 
does not seem to have varied over time in any systematic way with whether maize was a net 




Thailand’s cassava exports developed for the supply of animal feed to European and some Asian 
markets, including Taiwan. The quota restrictions of the EU led to rents attached to export 
quotas from Thailand, which in turn led to corruption in the allocation of these quotas. The rents 
associated with the quotas are analogous to a privately collected export tax, resulting in the 
export price exceeding the domestic price by amounts averaging around 10 percent, as shown in 




Soybean was a net export item for Thailand from 1960 until 1988, before becoming a net import 
item from 1992 onwards (Appendix Table A11). During the export period exports were taxed, 
but from 1995 onwards the trade regime shifted nominally to one of tariff quotas. The operation 
of these tariff quotas is summarized in Appendix Table A12. Within the quota volume of 
imports, soybeans could be imported at low or zero tariffs. Beyond the quota the applied tariff 
was set at the maximum amount permitted by Thailand’s WTO obligations, which varied 
between 80 and 90 percent. Figure 1(d) indicates that the transition of soybeans from a net export 
to net import in 1992 coincided with a shift from negative nominal rates of protection (around - 




In discussions of agricultural trade policy, the sugar industry is often an outlier in terms of the 
treatment it receives. Thailand is no exception. Sugar was an imported item until the late 1950s, 
but since has been a net export item. Nevertheless, it receives protection in the form of a ‘home 
price scheme’. This type of scheme involves taxing consumers and using the proceeds to 
subsidize exports. A scheme of this kind was practiced in the Australian sugar and dairy 
industries in the 1950s and 1960s (Sieper 1982). Reportedly, a Thai economics student at an 
Australian university learned about the scheme and imported the idea into Thailand, where it has 
since been applied to the Thai sugar industry, long after the scheme was abandoned in Australia.  
A home price scheme drives up the domestic consumer and producer prices of the 
product, subsidizing the producer at the expense of the consumer. To make the scheme work, 
leakage from the export market to the more profitable domestic market has to be prevented. In 
most industries, this is difficult. Re-importing for domestic consumption must also be restricted 
and, as Corden (1974 p. 17) points out, this can be achieved by a sufficiently restrictive tariff. 
From the point of view of the finance ministry, an attraction is that the scheme is self-financing. 
But as a protectionist device, a limitation of the scheme is that the capacity of the consumption 
tax to subsidize exports is reduced if the volume of exports becomes a large share of total output 
(exports plus domestic consumption). This has been an issue in the case of the Thai sugar 
industry.   
Siamwalla and Setboonsarng (1989 and 1991) attribute the political power of the Thai 
sugar industry to technological changes within the sugar milling industry which required large 
mills and precise scheduling of sugar deliveries to these mills. Sugar milling is a highly capital 
intensive business, and during the sugar processing season it is essential that the processing 
plants be fully utilized. Growers and millers have bickered over prices, but they have been able 
to combine their efforts to lobby the government for intervention on their behalf, something 
other agricultural export industries in Thailand have been unable to achieve. In Thailand, sugar 
growers and millers are highly organized. In the case of the Thai sugar industry, the 
technological changes mentioned above also helped restrict leakage from the export market to 
home consumption, because the mills were large and few in number.   10
Consumer prices have been stabilized by the scheme, relative to the export price. Figure 
1(e), based on the data assembled in Appendix Table A13, shows two series: the ratio of the 
consumer price to the border price (left axis) and the ratio of the miller rice to the grower price 
(right axis). The peak export prices of the early 1970s were not transmitted to consumers or 
producers and at this time the NRP for sugar (calculated as the percentage deviation of the 
grower price from the export price) was negative. But for most of the operation of the scheme, 
consumer and producer prices have been well above export prices. Since the mid-1980s the 
NRPs averaged over 60 percent.  Even though it is exported, sugar is by far the most heavily 




Thailand’s palmoil industry fluctuated between being a net importer and a net exporter, as 
summarized in Appendix Table A14. Although the industry has been a net exporter since 1998, a 
system of import quotas remains in place, as described in Appendix Table A15. Figure 1(f) 




Rubber is a net export item for Thailand, and the Thai rubber industry was for a long time 
subject to an export tax. The manner of calculating the tax meant that the rate drifted upwards 
with inflation and, due to the inflation of the 1970s, the rate of export tax had reached 26 percent 
by the early 1980s. Pressure from members of Parliament from the rubber growing areas of the 
south of Thailand led to the revision of the system of calculation, which led to a return to the 
lower rates of taxation that were in place in the 1960s. Figure 1(g), based on the data assembled 




Thailand imports urea for use as fertilizer, and urea imports have been subjected to declining 
rates of tariff protection over time. Taxation of imports of this agricultural input implies   11
disprotection for agricultural industries which use it. The decline in tariff rates began in the early 
1990s, and by the early 2000s the tariff rates were negligible. These policy changes are 
confirmed by the price comparisons reported in Figure 1(h), based on the data assembled in 
Appendix Table A17. Nominal rates of protection have declined steadily and are currently close 
to zero. This treatment of fertilizer in Thailand — steadily declining rates of taxation — contrasts 
with several neighboring countries, where fertilizer use has tended to be subsidized as part of a 
general program of agricultural subsidization.  
 
 
Imputed assistance at the farm level 
 
The above discussion of protection rates has focused to the effects that policy interventions have 
at the wholesale market level. In this section, we extend the analysis to consider the way 




One of the intentions of agricultural protection policy is to influence prices at the farm level. But 
the goods produced directly by farmers seldom enter international trade themselves. The raw 
commodities produced by farmers are generally non-traded, whereas the commodities which 
enter international trade are the processed or partially processed versions of these raw products. 
Between the non-traded raw product produced by the farmer and the traded processed 
commodity which enters international trade, there may be several steps of transport, storage, 
milling, processing and re-packaging.  
The significance of this point is that border protection policy operates directly on the 
goods which actually enter international trade, either exported or imported, not the raw 
commodities produced by farmers. Protection at the farm level is therefore a derived effect. It 
depends on the extent to which policies applied to trade in processed agricultural goods induce 
changes in their prices which are then transmitted to the prices actually faced by farmers. The 
question thus arises as to what extent price changes at the wholesale level, induced by protection 
policy, affect the prices actually received by farmers for the raw products they sell.   12
We construct a simple econometric model to investigate this issue. We use the notational 
convention that upper case Roman letters (like  X ) will denote the values of variables in their 
levels and lower case Roman letters (like x) will denote their natural logarithms. Thus  X x ln = . 
Protection at the wholesale level is defined as  
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where   denotes the level of the wholesale price of commodity i at time t,   is the 
corresponding border price, expressed in the domestic currency and adjusted for handling costs 
in getting the commodity from the cif level to the domestic wholesale level, in the case of an 
import, and for the cost of getting it from the wholesale level to the fob level in the case of an 
export. The nominal rate of protection at the wholesale level is given by  . In this discussion, 
both the border price and the nominal rate of protection are treated as exogenous variables. The 
border price is determined by world markets and the country concerned is presumed to be a price 







The farm gate price of the raw material is denoted by   and its logarithm,  , is 
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where  and  are coefficients and   is a random error term. The coefficient   is the ‘pass-
through’ or ‘transmission’ elasticity. The estimated values of the coefficients  and  are 
denoted  and  , respectively. The econometric estimation of these parameters is discussed 
below.  
i a i b it u i b
i a i b
i a ˆ i b ˆ
The estimated coefficients are used as follows. We estimate the logarithm of the farm 
price that would obtain in the absence of any protection as  
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where  is the estimated value of the wholesale price that would obtain in the absence of 
protection,  . This is then compared with the estimated value of the wholesale price 
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Denoting the anti-logs of  and  by  and  , respectively. The nominal rate of 
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It is important to observe that the value of the protection-inclusive farm level price used 
in these calculations is the level estimated from the econometric model (equation 4) rather than 
the actual price given by the raw data. The reason is that our intention is to use the model to 
estimate the change in the farm gate price caused by protection at the wholesale level. Thus both 
the protection-inclusive and the protection-exclusive prices used in (5) are their predicted values, 
obtained from the model.  
The implied nominal rate of protection at the farm level can be related to the nominal rate 
of protection at the wholesale level, as follows. Substituting  and 
into equation (5), where   is the anti-log of  , rearranging, and using 
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Obviously, if  , then  , regardless of the value of  . Similarly, if  , then 
, regardless of the value of  . Also, if  , then  . It can readily be seen 
0 =
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The purpose of the econometric analysis is to estimate the parameter   for each commodity. 
Details of the econometric analysis are provided in a statistical appendix, available upon request. 
Here the results will be summarized. For each commodity we conduct the analysis using time 
series price data with each variable expressed in logarithms and each deflated by the GDP 
deflator for Thailand: the farm-gate price (LFP), the wholesale price (LWP), and the log of the 
international price, adjusted by the nominal exchange rate and transport and handling costs 
(LIP). 
i b ˆ
We first test each of the series for the existence of a unit root. The null hypothesis of a 
unit root was rejected for all price series (recalling that they are real, not nominal, price series, 
using the GDP deflator) for all commodities except soybean. However, in the case of soybean 
the two price series where the null hypothesis of a unit root could not be rejected, the series were 
not cointegrated. For all commodities except soybean, the price series were thus considered 
stationary. 
Ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates of equation (2) were first produced. In most 
cases, autorrelation was a problem and an AR(1) correction term was included to eliminate it, 
which it did effectively. The OLS estimates assume that LFP is endogenous and LWP is 
exogenous. These assumptions were tested using Hausman’s endogeneity test. In the case of 
each commodity, the null hypothesis that LWP was (weakly) exogenous to LFP failed to be 
rejected, confirming the validity of the OLS estimates. Reverse Hausman’s tests were also 
conducted and the null hypothesis that LFP was exogenous to LWP was rejected in every case. 
These results support the validity of using the OLS framework to estimate the transmission 
elasticity from LWP to LFP, treating LWP as exogenous. For completeness, instrumental 
variable estimates were produced for each commodity, using LIP as the instrument for LWP. The 
resulting estimates of  differed from the OLS estimates (some larger, some smaller) but not by 
much.  
i b ˆ  15
Table 3 summarizes the estimates. All of the OLS estimates of the transmission elasticity 
were significantly different from zero with the expected positive signs. This is an important 
point. It is often asserted that middlemen prevent the commodity price changes at the wholesale 
level, resulting from protection or from international price movements, from being transmitted to 
farmers. This hypothesis is strongly rejected by the Thai data. The transmission elasticities are 
not zero. Economists often assume that the transmission elasticities are unity. But the estimated 
values are generally less than unity, most between 0.7 and 0.9. In one case (sugar) the estimate is 
somewhat lower (0.53) and in another (cassava) the estimated value slightly exceeds unity, but is 
not significantly different from unity.
4 It is likely that the true transmission elasticities change 
over time, but the limited data available for this exercise made it necessary to assume that the 
true values remain constant. 
 
Estimation of assistance at the farm level 
 
Given the estimated value of the transmission elastity, equation (6) is used together with the 
estimated nominal rates of protection at the wholesale level, discussed above, to produce 
estimates of imputed nominal rates of assistance at the farm level. These are shown in Appendix 
Figure A4. Because the estimated values of the transmission elasticity are (except for cassava) 
between zero and unity, the imputed nominal rates of assistance at the farm level are somewhat 
lower in absolute value than the nominal rates at the wholesale level, but (because of the 
assumption of constant transmission elasticities through time) they track the pattern of the 
wholesale level results closely. 
 
 
Aggregate measures of agricultural assistance 
 
 
                                                 
4 There is no theoretical reason to suppose that the true value of the transmission elasticity is necessarily below 
unity. For example, if all margins between the farm level and wholesale level remained constant in nominal terms as 
the wholesale price changed, the percentage change in the derived farm level price would necessarily exceed the 
percentage change in the wholesale price. The transmission elasticity would therefore exceed unity.   16
In this section we calculate aggregate measures of rates of assistance using the information 
assembled from the preceding analysis and following, as much as possible, the methodology 
outlined in Anderson et al. (2008). The annual calculations reported in this section fluctuate 
somewhat from year to year. International and domestic price changes from year to year alter the 
protective effects of all instruments of protection except ad valorem tariffs. In addition, the time 
taken for domestic prices to adjust to international price changes means that annual data on price 
differences produces some spurious variation from one year to the next. Our interest is on broad 
trends, rather than these annual fluctuations.  
Table 4 reports estimates of the nominal rates of assistance (NRA) at the farm level for 
all commodities, taking account of assistance to fertilizer inputs. This nominal rate of assistance 
is calculated as its nominal rate of protection (discussed above) minus the product of the cost 
share of fertilizer in production of the commodity concerned and the consumer tax equivalent 
(CTE) of import protection to the fertilizer industry. The CTE for fertilizer is positive in every 
year but one, although the rates of taxation have declined since the mid-1980s. The nominal rates 
for covered products at the wholesale level are therefore below the nominal rates of assistance at 
the farm level for every commodity using fertilizer as an input. Aside from this, the broad pattern 
of the nominal rates of farmer assistance is similar to the pattern of nominal rates discussed 
above. 
The NRAs are negative in all years for rice and in most years for maize, cassava and 
rubber. For these commodities, the absolute magnitudes of these negative rates have declined 
over time. For soybean, the nominal rate was negative until soybean became a net import item in 
the early 1990s, since when it has been significantly protected. Sugar has been a protected 
commodity in almost all years. The weighted average for all covered products was more than -25 
percent prior to the latter 1970s, but that mean rate of taxation has since fallen to virtually zero. 
The dispersion of rates for individual commodities around that mean has not fallen very much 
though, suggesting there is still considerable scope through further policy reform to reduce 
distortions within the farm sector (bottom of Table 4).   
Finally, the relative rate of assistance to agriculture (RRA) is calculated to take into 
account not just the nominal rate of assistance to agriculture but also the nominal rate of 
assistance to manufacturing and other non-farm tradable sectors. The average rate for import-  17
competing manufacturing is estimated from Nicita and Olarreaga (2006),
5 and that for other non-
farm tradable sectors is assumed to be zero. Their weighted average is then calculated using 
weights from the input-output tables of the National Economic and Social Development Board 
(various years). The estimated RRA is negative in every year, but has declined in absolute value 
from being more than -30 percent in the early 1970s to around -7 percent in recent years (Table 5 
and Figure 3). That is, these estimates suggest that over the past four decades Thai agriculture 
has moved from being a severely net taxed sector to a mildly net taxed sector.  
 
 
Conclusions and prospects for future reform 
 
 
As Thailand has industrialized, successive Thai governments have become increasingly 
interested in intervening on behalf of agricultural producers. But the fact that Thailand is a major 
agricultural exporter has limited the scope for protection policy as a means of influencing 
domestic commodity prices. This chapter has used comparisons between the prices of 
agricultural commodities in domestic markets and international markets as a means of studying 
the magnitudes of these interventions.  
Over time, the direct taxation of agricultural exports has been gradually eliminated. This 
has been important in the case of rice, where the high rates of export taxation prior to the mid-
1980s have been abolished. Rubber exports, taxed prior to 1990, have been untaxed since then. 
Cassava exports have continued to be taxed to a minor extent by the system of export quotas. 
Fertilizer is a major input into agricultural production and effective taxation of fertilizer use has 
been steadily eliminated since the early 1990s. Maize exports have been consistently untaxed, as 
have chicken exports. Most of this is a story of eliminating the price distortions which formerly 
acted against agricultural export industries.  
Three commodities depart from this general story of liberalization of agricultural 
markets. Soybeans was an export prior to 1992 and has been a net import since then, with 
                                                 
5 Because the Nicita and Olarreaga (2006) data are incomplete we have assumed NRAs for manufacturing before 
1982 and after 2002 to be the same as the Nicita and Olarreaga 1982 and 2002 levels, respectively. This undoubtedly 
understates rates of manufacturing protection in the 1970s, and overstates it post-2002. More-complete estimates for 
manufacturing therefore would reinforce, rather than undermine our broad conclusions.   18
imports subject to quota restrictions. The change from net export to net import coincided with a 
switch from negative to positive nominal rates of protection. Since the early 1990s the domestic 
soybean industry received a nominal rate of protection of around between 30 and 40 percent. 
Sugar is an export commodity for Thailand but the domestic sugar industry is protected by a 
system which taxes domestic consumers and transfers the revenue to producers. Nominal rates of 
protection averaged over 60 percent. The political power of the highly capital intensive sugar 
milling industry is the explanation for this pattern of protection. The case of palmoil is 
qualitatively similar to sugar, but the rates of protection are somewhat lower. 
Government interventions on behalf of rural people have been important, but they have 
generally not taken the form of intervening in agricultural commodity markets. Cash transfers to 
village organizations, subsidized loan schemes not linked to agricultural production, and a 
generally good system of public infrastructure have been the main instruments. The prospects for 
further trade liberalization are not encouraging, unless this occurs through bilateral preferential 
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Figure 1: Price comparison and NRP
a at wholesale level for agricultural products, Thailand, 1968 
to 2004 
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Figure 1 (continued): Price comparison and NRP
a at wholesale level for agricultural products, 
Thailand, 1968 to 2004 
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Figure 1 (continued): Price comparison and NRP
a at wholesale level for agricultural products, 
Thailand, 1968 to 2004 












































































   23
Figure 1 (continued): Price comparison and NRP
a at wholesale level for agricultural products, 
Thailand, 1968 to 2004 







































































a Nominal rate of protection is calculated as 100*(Domestic price- Border price)/Border price. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data in Tables A4 and A10. 
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Figure 1 (continued): Price comparison and NRP
a at wholesale level for agricultural products, 
Thailand, 1968 to 2004 
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Figure 1 (continued): Price comparison and NRP
a at wholesale level for agricultural products, 
Thailand, 1968 to 2004 


































































a Nominal rate of protection is calculated as 100*(Domestic price- Border price)/Border price. 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data in Tables A6 and A10. 
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Figure 1 (continued): Price comparison and NRP
a at wholesale level for agricultural products, 
Thailand, 1968 to 2004 


















































































a Nominal rate of protection is calculated as 100*(Domestic price- Border price)/Border price. 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data in Tables A7 and A10. 
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Figure 1 (continued): Price comparison and NRP
a at wholesale level for agricultural products, 
Thailand, 1968 to 2004 
(baht/MT and percent) 







































































a Nominal rate of protection is calculated as 100*(Domestic price - Border price)/Border price. 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data in Tables A8 to A17. 
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Figure 2: Ratios of consumer price to border price and miller price to grower price for sugar, 







































































Consumer price/border price (Pc/Pb)







Source: Authors’ calculations based on data in Appendix Table A13. 
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Figure 3: Nominal rates of assistance to all agricultural tradables, all non-agricultural tradable 
industries, and relative rates of assistance
































































































t are the percentage NRAs for the tradable parts of the agricultural and non-
agricultural sectors, respectively. 
 
Source: Authors’ spreadsheet based on data in Appendix Table A22.   30
Table 1: Real growth of GDP and its components, Thailand, 1968 to 2005 
(percentage per annum) 
   
  Pre-boom  Boom   Crisis  Recovery 
Whole 
period 
  1968-1986  1987-1996  1997-1999  2000-2005  1968-2005 
Total GDP  6.7 9.5  -2.5  5.1  6.5 
Agriculture  4.5  2.6 0.1 3.6 3.5 
Industry  8.5 12.8  -1.7  6.3 8.5 
Services 6.8  9.0  -3.6  4.2  6.2 
 
Source: Author’s calculations from World Bank (various issues)    31
Table 2: Industry shares of agricultural value added, Thailand, 1975 to 2000 
(percent) 
 
Industry  1975  1980  1985  1990  1995  2000 
Paddy  38.0  30.3  34.7  24.9  26.9  26.1 
Maize  6.4  4.3  4.2  3.7  3.7  3.4 
Other cereals  0.5  0.6  0.5  0.2  0.1  0.2 
Cassava  4.2  7.6  5.5  6.6  5.2  2.5 
Beans & nuts  2.4  2.5  3.7  3.0  2.1  1.7 
Vegetables  11.7  10.4  9.1  12.7  9.9  10.6 
Fruits  11.4  15.0  10.5  10.9  11.1  15.8 
Sugar cane  5.9  5.4  3.2  6.7  5.2  5.3 
Coconut  1.4  1.7  1.8  1.2  0.9  0.7 
Palm nut and oil palm   0.0  0.1  0.6  1.2  1.2  1.4 
Rubber  2.2  4.6  8.4  10.2  17.5  12.4 
Other crops  5.7  5.2  5.3  4.3  4.3  4.3 
Cattle and buffalo  2.5  3.3  5.3  6.3  3.9  4.8 
Swine  3.2  3.0  1.6  1.9  1.7  1.5 
Poultry  1.1  2.0  4.0  3.6  3.9  6.6 
Other livestock  3.6  4.0  1.9  2.7  2.1  2.9 
        
Total, above industries  100  100  100  100  100  100 
 
Source: National Economic and Social Development Board (various years)   32
i b

























































a t-statistics are shown in parthentheses. 
b Estimation for palmoil was not possible, due to insufficient data points, and the estimated value 
for rubber was used instead. 
 
Source: Author’s calculations, using data and methodology discussed in the text. Estimates 
shown relate to the parameter  in equation (2). Table 4: Nominal rates of assistance to covered products, Thailand, 1970 to 2004 
(percent) 
    1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 
         
Exportables
a   -26.7 -19.4 -11.1 -11.7  -9.2  -3.8  -0.6 
Soybean*  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  -19.9 n.app. n.app. n.app. 
Rice  -30.1 -28.3 -18.0 -15.0 -16.2 -11.0  -7.6 
Maize  -2.2 -2.6 -2.2 -7.6 -4.5  -11.5 -0.3 
Cassava  -23.1  -0.8  -9.0 -16.6 -10.8 -13.8 -10.0 
Sugar  12.6 -3.2 12.7 36.8 34.0 22.4 12.6 
Rubber  -0.5 -8.7  -17.9  -13.3 -4.4 -1.1  0.2 
    Poultry  -32.9  16.1  26.8  -7.1  -11.0  17.8  20.4 
    Palmoil  n.a.  n.a.  n.app.  n.app.  n.app.  -12.6  -18.3 
         
Import-competing products 
a  -4.8 1.9  45.3  22.0 6.4  34.4 4.7 
   Soybean
c  n.app. n.app. n.app. n.app.  27.5  21.5  30.0 
   Pigmeat  -4.8  1.9  51.7  20.8  1.5  36.5  -1.8 
   Palmoil  n.a.  n.a.  -25.7  32.2  26.5  n.app.  n.app. 
         
Total of covered products 
a  -25.8  -18.4 -8.4 -9.7 -7.7 -1.1 -0.6 
Dispersion of covered products 
b  25.0 20.8 28.5 29.3 25.1 22.9 16.7 
%  coverage  (at  undistorted  prices)  65 65 68 71 71 75 78 
 
 
a Weighted averages, with weights based on the unassisted value of production.  
 
b Dispersion is a simple 5-year average of the annual standard deviation around the weighted mean of NRAs of covered products. 
 
c Exception to above periods: soybean averages for 1984-91 as Exportable, and 1992-94 and 2000-03 as Import-competing. 
  
Source: Authors’ spreadsheet, see Appendix Tables A18 to A20 2
Table 5: Nominal rates of assistance to agricultural relative to non-agricultural industries, Thailand, 1970 to 2004 
 (percent) 
    1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 
Covered products 
a  -25.8  -18.4 -8.4 -9.7 -7.7 -1.1 -0.6 
Non-covered  products    -10.4 -5.8 11.3  3.4 -0.9 10.1  1.4 
All agricultural products 
a  -20.3  -14.0 -2.0 -6.2 -5.7  1.7 -0.2 
Non-product  specific  (NPS)  assistance    0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Total agricultural NRA (incl. NPS) 
b  -20.3  -14.0 -2.0 -6.2 -5.7  1.7 -0.2 
Trade bias index 
c  -0.18 -0.20 -0.37 -0.24 -0.14 -0.27 -0.03 
         
Assistance to just tradables:         
   All agricultural tradables  -23.1  -15.9  -2.3  -6.9  -6.4  1.8  -0.2 
   All non-agricultural tradables  16.1  16.0  14.2  11.1  10.0  8.9  7.8 
Relative rate of assistance, RRA 
d  -33.7  -27.5  -14.4  -16.3  -14.9  -6.5  -7.4 
 
 
a. NRAs including product-specific input subsidies. 
 
b. NRAs including product-specific input subsidies and non-product-specific (NPS) assistance. Total of assistance to primary factors 
and intermediate inputs divided to total value of primary agriculture production at undistorted prices (%). 
 
c. Trade bias index is TBI = (1+NRAagx/100)/(1+NRAagm/100) – 1, where NRAagm and NRAagx are the average percentage NRAs 
for the import-competing and exportable parts of the agricultural sector. 
 




t are the percentage NRAs for the 
tradables parts of the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors, respectively.  
 
e. These memo items show what the average NRAag, trade bias index and RRA would be if the distortions in the market for foreign 
currency, as captured by the methodology outlined in Appendix 1 of this book, are ignored. 
 
Source: Authors’ spreadsheet, see Appendix Table A21. 
  
Appendix Figure A1: Annual growth rate of real GDP, Thailand, 1965 to 2005   
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Source: World Bank (various issues)   2
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Source: World Bank (various issues)   3
Appendix Figure A3: External terms of trade
a, Thailand, 1965 to 2004  

















a The external terms of trade are calculated here as the ratio of average unit value of 
exports (value relative to volume) to the average unit value of imports.  
 
Source: World Bank (various issues) 
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Appendix Figure A4: Prices and nominal rates of assistance

































































































Actual farm level price
Predicted price - with protection
Predicted price - without protection
Imputed nominal rate of protection (%)  
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Appendix Figure A4 (continued): Prices and nominal rates of assistance
a at the farm level, 





































































































Actual farm level price
Predicted price - with protection
Predicted price - without protection
Imputed nominal rate of protection (%)  
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Appendix Figure A4 (continued): Prices and nominal rates of assistance
a at the farm level, 




































































Actual farm level price
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Predicted price - without protection
Imputed nominal rate of protection (%)
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Appendix Figure A4 (continued): Prices and nominal rates of assistance
a at the farm level, 
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Imputed nominal rate of protection (%)
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Appendix Figure A4 (continued): Prices and nominal rates of assistance
a at the farm level, 
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Predicted price - with protection
Predicted price - without protection
Imputed nominal rate of protection (%)
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Appendix Figure A4 (continued): Prices and nominal rates of assistance
a at the farm level, 
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Appendix Figure A4 (continued): Prices and nominal rates of assistance
a at the farm level, 
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Appendix Figure A4 (continued): Prices and nominal rates of assistance
a at the farm level, 
Thailand, 1968 to 2004 
(percent) 





























































Actual farm level price
Predicted price - with protection
Predicted price - without protection




a Imputed nominal rate of assistance is calculated as 100*(Predicted price with protection - 
Predicted price without protection)/ Predicted price without protection. 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on methodology and data discussed in the text. 
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Source: calculations using FAOSTAT data   13




Industry  1975  1980  1985  1990  1995  2000 
Paddy  85.8  85.2  78.3  77.5  76.8  69.6 
Maize  77.8  75.6  62.2  60.9  61.6  60.5 
Other cereals  83.0  80.7  58.9  64.0  71.6  72.7 
Cassava  87.1  84.1  69.7  74.7  73.4  64.6 
Beans & nuts  86.1  85.8  67.5  70.1  73.1  57.6 
Vegetables  83.7  82.4  71.7  76.3  73.5  64.3 
Fruits  87.1  182.5  76.5  78.1  78.4  65.9 
Sugar cane  80.7  80.0  63.1  70.6  68.2  64.4 
Coconut  91.2  92.9  87.8  89.0  84.1  89.8 
Palm nut and oil palm   91.9  90.8  76.9  71.2  70.9  61.6 
Rubber  92.5  92.6  85.6  83.0  83.4  84.8 
Other crops  83.1  84.3  71.7  70.8  72.3  65.5 
Cattle and buffalo  86.0  87.9  81.5  81.5  75.6  80.1 
Swine  41.1  41.2  20.1  20.3  19.6  28.1 
Poultry  34.5  40.9  31.6  29.6  31.6  38.1 
Other livestock  45.2  45.7  40.0  40.3  34.7  38.7 
         
Total agriculture  78.4  83.9  67.5  67.2  67.2  62.9 
 
 
Source: National Economic and Social Development Board (various years)   14
Appendix Table A2: Imported intermediate inputs as a share of total intermediate inputs
a, by 
agricultural industry, Thailand, 1975 to 2000 
(percent) 
 
Industry  1975  1980  1990  1995  2000 
Paddy  17.7  19.6  28.3  27.4  36.2 
Maize  2.2  2.5  9.6  13.4  35.7 
Other cereals  0.6  0.4  0.3  1.0  2.5 
Cassava  5.1  3.4  15.6  13.0  0.2 
Beans & nuts  6.7  6.9  14.2  12.3  0.6 
Vegetables  19.9  27.2  25.8  25.8  16.6 
Fruits  24.2  23.9  31.6  25.0  24.4 
Sugar cane  16.0  17.3  20.6  21.2  16.6 
Coconut  17.9  19.2  18.3  41.0  0.0 
Palm nut and oil palm   16.2  17.3  5.6  21.9  0.5 
Rubber  23.7  26.6  47.2  46.3  45.5 
Other crops  23.3  23.0  25.8  27.7  14.3 
Cattle and buffalo  1.4  0.9  4.9  5.3  2.7 
Swine  0.3  0.6  2.7  6.1  0.1 
Poultry  1.6  1.4  3.4  6.1  0.7 
Other livestock  0.6  0.6  2.5  5.8  1.0 
        
Total agriculture  9.8  10.6  15.4  17.6  16.8 
 
 
a The Thai input-output table for 1985 does not distinguish between imported and domestically 
produced intermediate inputs and so does not support the calculations reported in the table.  
 
Source: National Economic and Social Development Board (various years) 
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Industry  1975  1980
c  1985  1990  1995  2000 
Paddy
 a,b  94.0  94.3  99.0  98.2  97.6  100 
Maize  16.5  14.2  97.6  44.0  61.7  93.6 
Other cereals  36.4  59.1  53.4  100  99.9  95.2 
Cassava  97.9  99.6  97.7  96.2  95.9  98.1 
Beans & nuts  29.9  23.0  49.5  65.5  70.1  81.6 
Vegetables  11.2  7.2  18.4  22.6  25.9  24.6 
Fruits  5.7  4.6  16.0  20.9  20.5  35.8 
Sugar cane  96.9  82.9  99.9  100  100  100 
Coconut  14.9  13.0  37.2  54.3  57.8  68.5 
Palm nut and oil palm   95.9  97.7  98.7  93.4  92.7  88.8 
Rubber  100.0  100.0  87.3  71.9  67.3  86.4 
Other crops  69.9  68.6  77.8  79.7  74.9  81.5 
Cattle and buffalo  94.3  95.2  98.5  92.3  100  100 
Swine  100  99.9  100  95.3  99.4  99.3 
Poultry  64.2  72.1  82.5  75.5  87.1  91.1 
Other livestock  12.2  10.0  31.8  33.1  33.0  39.5 
         
Total agriculture  57.3  55.2  71.0  67.0  68.8  70.0 
 
a The input-output tables classify unmilled rice (paddy) as an output of the agricultural sector and 
milled rice as an output of the manufacturing sector. 
b Milled rice excluded.  
c Data for 1980 refer to milled cereal. 
 
Source: National Economic and Social Development Board (various years) 
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Appendix Table A4: Industry sales to export users as a share of industry total sales
 a, Thailand, 
1975 to 2000 
(percent) 
 
Industry  1975  1980  1985  1990  1995  2000 
Paddy  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Maize  77.6  79.2  0.0  34.7  2.8  1.7 
Other cereals  53.7  32.9  43.5  7.8  3.0  5.2 
Cassava  0.0  0.0  0.0  2.2  0.0  0.0 
Beans & nuts  31.5  34.4  38.6  24.5  11.1  7.9 
Vegetables  0.5  0.9  2.0  1.7  3.0  2.6 
Fruits  1.2  1.5  5.2  4.5  8.0  8.0 
Sugar cane  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Coconut  0.2  0.1  2.5  1.8  2.2  7.2 
Palm nut and oil palm   4.1  2.3  1.1  4.9  4.4  8.9 
Rubber             0.0  0.0  0.0  6.3  32.4  19.3 
Other crops  10.4  12.5  14.0  12.3  17.3  11.2 
Cattle and buffalo  4.9  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Swine  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Poultry  0.3  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Other livestock  1.2  0.2  0.5  1.2  1.9  1.9 
         
Total agriculture  7.6  6.1  4.1  4.5  7.4  4.9 
         
Rice milling  15.1  36.7  32.6  35.5  39.8  51.7 
Refined sugar  56.5  22.4  36.3  47.0  48.3  39.1 
 
a The input-output tables classify unmilled rice (paddy) as an output of the agricultural sector and 
milled rice as an output of the manufacturing sector. 
 
Source: National Economic and Social Development Board (various years) 
   17
Appendix Table A5: Imports’ share of total usage,
 a Thailand, 1975 to 2000 
(percent) 
 
Industry  1975  1980  1985  1990  1995  2000 
Paddy  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Maize  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  6.9  7.8 
Other cereals  34.6  33.7  39.6  71.0  79.9  81.2 
Cassava  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Beans & nuts  0.2  2.8  1.1  4.0  16.9  52.3 
Vegetables  0.9  0.6  0.7  0.5  1.0  0.6 
Fruits  0.5  0.2  1.7  3.4  6.9  3.7 
Sugar cane  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Coconut  0.0  6.5  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.5 
Palm nut and oil palm   0.0  0.2  0.1  0.4  0.1  1.5 
Rubber  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1 
Other crops  23.1  24.8  33.0  47.0  45.4  44.5 
Cattle and buffalo  0.3  0.0  0.1  2.4  0.9  2.9 
Swine  0.0  0.1  0.5  0.2  0.1  0.0 
Poultry  0.6  1.3  0.6  1.1  1.0  0.2 
Other livestock  0.2  0.2  2.0  10.3  8.7  7.6 
         
Total agriculture  2.2  2.3  3.5  5.7  6.3  7.2 
         
Rice milling  0.0  0.0  0.2  0.1  0.2  0.0 
Refined sugar  0.1  10.1  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.7 
 
a The input-output tables classify unmilled rice (paddy) as an output of the agricultural sector and 
milled rice as an output of the manufacturing sector. 
  
Source: National Economic and Social Development Board (various years) 
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Commodity  Domestic price  Border price 
Rice  Domestic price  Export price 
Maize  Domestic price  Export price 
Cassava  Domestic price  Export price 
Sugar  Grower price  Export price 
Rubber  Domestic price  Export price 
Soybean  Domestic price  Export price (up to 1991) 
Import price (after 1991) 
Palmoil  Domestic price  Export price  
Fertilizer (urea)  Wholesale price   Import price 
 
 




D denotes the domestic price and P
B 
denotes the border price.  
 
Source: Authors’ classification 
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Appendix Table A7: Transport and handling costs between border and wholesale level of 
agricultural products, Thailand  
(percentage of gross value) 
 
 


































Source: Thailand, Ministry of Commerce, Bangkok.  
   20
Appendix Table A8: Price comparisons and trade status, rice,
a ,b Thailand, 1968 to 2005 
 
Rice : Nominal Price (Paddy basis)  Year 
Domestic price (baht/ton) (1)  Border price (baht /ton) (2) 
Trade 
1968 1,231  3,034  X 
1969 1,381  2,618  X 
1970 1,182  2,053  X 
1971 1,011  1,784  X 
1972 1,168  2,068  X 
1973 1,650  2,750  X 
1974 2,348  6,517  X 
1975 2,269  4,364  X 
1976 2,282  2,963  X 
1977 2,309  3,582  X 
1978 2,498  4,222  X 
1979 2,751  3,887  X 
1980 3,405  5,071  X 
1981 3,628  5,865  X 
1982 3,212  3,954  X 
1983 3,228  3,789  X 
1984 3,041  3,713  X 
1985 2,757  3,622  X 
1986 2,428  3,165  X 
1987 3,027  3,570  X 
1988 3,971  4,658  X 
1989 4,286  4,969  X 
1990 3,632  4,186  X 
1991 3,978  4,620  X 
1992 3,647  4,225  X 
1993 3,082  3,959  X 
1994 3,562  5,034  X 
1995 4,561  5,081  X 
1996 4,897  5,524  X 
1997 5,029  6,174  X 
1998 6,971  7,910  X 
1999 5,252  5,953  X 
2000 4,404  5,065  X 
2001 4,309  4,758  X 
2002 4,710  5,111  X 
2003 4,648  5,037  X 
2004 5,659  6,058  X 
2005 6,597  7,071  X 
 
a To make the old and new series consistent, we have to redefine the product composition as 
follows. According to Siamwalla and Setboonsarng (1989), a ton of paddy is composed of 450 
kg white rice 5 percent, 150 kg broken rice A1 extra, 30 kg broken rice C1 extra, and 30 kg 
broken rice C3. Nonetheless, broken rice C1 and C3 are no longer reported by Department of 
Internal Trade, Ministry of Commerce. We use the new definition is one ton of paddy is defined 
as 450 kgs of white rice 5 percent, plus 210 kgs of broken rice A1 special. This new definition is 
applied for the series 1968-2005. The correlation coefficients are greater than 95 percent. 
b X=Net export; M = Net Import; and N= Non-trade/Balanced Trade. 
Source: Thailand, Ministry of Commerce, Department of Internal Trade; Board of Trade of 
Thailand.  21
Appendix Table A9: Price comparisons and trade status  for maize
a, Thailand, 1960 to 2005 
 
Maize : Nominal Price (Maize grain basis) 
Border price (baht/ton) 


























h  1,067 n.a.  n.a.  463,500  n.a.  X 
1961 n.a.  1,127 n.a.  n.a.  538,874  n.a.  X 
1962 0  1,101  n.a. n.a. 448,785  0  X 
1963 n.a.  1,092 n.a.  n.a.  706,844  n.a.  X 
1964 n.a.  1,142 n.a.  n.a. 1,059,289  n.a.  X 
1965 n.a.  1,257 n.a.  n.a.  764,161  n.a.  X 
1966 n.a.  1,193 n.a.  n.a. 1,157,610  n.a.  X 
1967 n.a.  1,225 820 1,162  1,036,224  n.a.  X 
1968 n.a.  1,023 740  970 1,406,799  n.a.  X 
1969 n.a.  1,135 810 1,117  1,402,301  n.a.  X 
1970 n.a.  1,263 950 1,229  1,302,900  n.a.  X 
1971 n.a.  1,247 800 1,202  1,715,733  n.a.  X 
1972 n.a.  1,095 890 1,164  1,669,700  n.a.  X 
1973  n.a.  1,976 1,440 1,784 1,240,873  n.a.  X 
1974  n.a.  2,623 2,100 2,555 2,080,794  n.a.  X 
1975  n.a.  2,656 1,860 2,483 1,968,665  n.a.  X 
1976  n.a.  2,292 1,660 2,217 2,268,774  n.a.  X 
1977  n.a.  2,124 1,600 2,131 1,441,984  n.a.  X 
1978  n.a.  2,163 1,630 2,114 1,856,849  n.a.  X 
1979  n.a.  2,765 2,040 2,638 1,888,743  n.a.  X 
1980  n.a.  3,196 2,400 3,022 2,066,564  n.a.  X 
1981  n.a.  3,243 2,230 2,960 2,420,049  n.a.  X 
1982  n.a.  2,850 2,250 2,850 2,661,180  n.a.  X 
1983  n.a.  3,129 2,370 3,129 2,498,543  n.a.  X 
1984  n.a.  3,085 2,410 3,085 2,960,905  n.a.  X 
1985  n.a.  2,950 1,930 2,839 2,614,796  n.a.  X 
1986  n.a.  2,570 1,630 2,235 3,734,000  n.a.  X 
1987  n.a.  2,630 2,260 2,500 1,465,557  n.a.  X 
1988  n.a.  3,210 2,650 3,155 1,087,885  n.a.  X 
1989  n.a.  3,800 2,890 3,666 1,062,739  n.a.  X 
1990  n.a.  3,260 2,550 3,220 1,226,000  n.a.  X 
1991  n.a.  3,130 2,670 3,054 1,215,000  n.a.  X 
1992
f  3,835 3,500 2,840 3,408  135,000  440,000  M 
1993 4,900 3,080 2,760 3,140  179,000  9,000  X 
1994 8,300 3,540 2,860 3,483  125,000  9,805  X 
1995 4,048 4,760 3,850 4,570  96,190  276,000  M 
1996 5,348 5,069 4,060 4,896  50,443  307,000  M 
1997 8,020 5,003 4,180 4,703  51,460  235,000  M 
1998 5,174 5,207 3,950 5,052  112,700  228,000  M 
1999 4,930 4,665 4,100 4,626  64,900  109,350  M 
2000 4,470 4,760 3,980 4,710  19,944  338,720  M 
2001  19,380 4,509 3,940 4,356  490,851  6,647  X 
2002  21,820 4,856 4,090 4,734  146,050  4,916  X 
2003  10,710 5,060 4,420 4,930  189,418  7,868  X 
2004 4,800 5,730 4,450 5,636  871,792  75,754  X 
2005  n.a.  5,824 4,800 5,475  58,662  58,626  N 
 
   22
a Despite unspecified type of maize used in Siamwalla and Setboonsarng (1989), we use grained 
maize at the grade of 14 percent moisture. Its time pattern is similar to Siamwalla and 
Setboonsarng (1989). Import and export price are adjusted for the same basis.  
b Domestic price is the wholesale prices in Bangkok Metropolis. 
c Farm price is the official reported price. 
d Export price is fob price of maize. 
e Import price is cif price of maize. 
f During 1992-1999 import price and quantity are roughly estimated, using FOA data. 
g * represents the number is negligible. 
h n.a. is not available. 
i Trade definition: X=Net export; M = Net Import; and N= Non-trade/Balanced Trade. 
 
Source:(1) Bank of Thailand Quarterly Bulletin, Bank of Thailand. 
(2) and (3) Office of Agricultural Economics, Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives.   23
Appendix Table A10: Price comparisons and trade status for cassava, Thailand, 1060 to 2004 
 
Cassava : Nominal Price (Cassava pellet basis
 a) 











1960 n.a.  n.a.  n.a
 e. X 
1961 n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  X 
1962 n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  X 
1963 n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  X 
1964 n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  X 
1965 n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  X 
1966 n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  X 
1967 n.a.  n.a.  450  X 
1968 n.a.  n.a.  480  X 
1969 699  819  410  X 
1970 762  859  390  X 
1971 817  1,013  370  X 
1972 828  1,110  480  X 
1973 1,033  1,288  290  X 
1974 1,195  1,433  290  X 
1975 1,571  1,857  400  X 
1976 1,688  1,937  460  X 
1977 1,543  1,884  480  X 
1978 1,450  1,692  360  X 
1979 2,493  2,427  740  X 
1980 2,524  2,731  750  X 
1981 1,907  2,519  540  X 
1982 2,110  2,419  580  X 
1983 2,720  2,778  730  X 
1984 1,730  2,380  580  X 
1985 1,520  1,965  430  X 
1986 2,722  2,847  840  X 
1987 2,582  3,207  840  X 
1988 2,186  2,632  580  X 
1989 1,913  2,341  540  X 
1990 2,373  2,713  710  X 
1991 2,625  3,131  820  X 
1992 2,570  2,927  770  X 
1993 2,154  2,580  600  X 
1994 2,438  2,571  710  X 
1995 3,115  3,168  1,160  X 
1996 2,937  3,314  910  X 
1997 2,224  2,803  710  X 
1998 3,173  3,410  1,300  X 
1999 2,689  2,900  830  X 
2000 2,045  2,367  610  X 
2001 2,231  2,451  770  X 
2002 2,721  2,688  1,040  X 
2003 2,603  2,740  890  X 
2004 2,720  2,888  880  X 
 
 
   24
a We use cassava pellet for the basis for the price comparison because it has the highest 
proportion in cassava export during 2001-2004. 
b Domestic price is the average wholesale prices of cassava pellets. 
c Border price is the F.O.B. price of cassava pellets, i.e. the ratio between export value and its 
quantity. 
d Farm price is the official reported price that the farmer of raw cassava received. 
e n.a. is not available. 
f Trade definition: X=Net export; M = Net Import; and N= Non-trade/Balanced Trade. 
 
Source: 
(1) Bank of Thailand Quarterly Bulletin, Bank of Thailand. 
(2) And (3) Office of Agricultural Economics, Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives. 
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Appendix Table A11: Price comparisons and trade status for soybeans, Thailand, 1960 to 2005 
 
Soybean : Nominal Price (Mixed grade soybean grain basis) 
Border price 

























1960  0  n.a.  n.a. n.a. n.a.  0  X 
1961 0  2,493  n.a.  n.a.  2,090  0  X 
1962 0  2,611  n.a.  n.a.  1,910  0  X 
1963 0  2,296  n.a.  n.a.  4,400  0  X 
1964 0  2,153  n.a.  n.a.  4,320  0  X 
1965 0  2,804  n.a.  n.a.  1,610  0  X 
1966 0  2,608  n.a.  n.a.  5,608  0  X 
1967 0  2,565  n.a.  n.a.  5,897  0  X 
1968 0  2,716  n.a.  n.a.  3,486  0  X 
1969 0  2,645  n.a.  n.a.  4,973  0  X 
1970 0  2,576  n.a.  n.a.  6,290  0  X 
1971 0  2,800  n.a.  n.a.  6,099  0  X 
1972 0  3,187  n.a.  n.a.  7,240  0  X 
1973 0  5,535  n.a.  n.a.  13,715  0  X 
1974 0  5,458  n.a.  n.a.  8,612  0  X 
1975 0  5,561  n.a.  n.a.  24,055  0  X 
1976 0  5,858  n.a.  n.a.  8,132  0  X 
1977 6,376  7,175  n.a.  n.a.  11,506  4,003  X 
1978 5,495  6,333  n.a.  n.a.  8,099  10,808  X 
1979 7,000  7,026  n.a.  n.a.  9,715  5  X 
1980 6,577  8,231  n.a.  n.a.  3,394  15,297  X 
1981 7,000  8,917  n.a.  n.a.  2,531  15  X 
1982 5,541  8,801  n.a.  n.a.  1,295  3,218  X 
1983 23,000  8,958  n.a.  n.a.  1,035  1  X 
1984 4,981  8,752  5,430  6,916  995  107  X 
1985  20,000  9,264  5,820 6,659 2,342  1  X 
1986  0 9,326  6,030 7,279 1,983  0  X 
1987 25,070  10,211  7,250  8,742  142  1  X 
1988 7,992  11,688  8,410  10,933  16  33,277  X 
1989 220,667  11,273  7,890  10,010  11  9  N 
1990 185,750  17,149  7,020  8,902  74  16  N 
1991 237,853  11,410  7,440  9,496  529  34  X 
1992 6,311  11,672  7,600  9,407  781  158,047  M 
1993 7,121  14,834  7,630  9,505  471  44,689  M 
1994 7,179  12,567  7,640  9,985  312  97,998  M 
1995 7,417  14,882  7,650  9,855  279  203,157  M 
1996 8,169  12,838  8,860  11,040  222  418,811  M 
1997 9,908  18,094  8,250  10,975  329  869,397  M 
1998 10,392  10,881  9,710  13,205  797  687,255  M 
1999 7,892  13,095  8,870  12,185  781  1,007,984  M 
2000 8,690  17,099  9,190  13,115  617  1,320,402  M 
2001 9,092  21,887  9,320  12,855  335  1,363,224  M 
2002  9,124  17,417  10,390 13,395  835 1,528,557  M 
2003  10,864  21,241  10,210 15,020  572 1,689,649  M 
2004  13,200  23,844  11,260 17,275  975 1,435,803  M 
2005 11,591  31,071  10,720  14,680  1,223  1,607,784  M 
 
   26
a Domestic price is the average wholesale prices of mixed grade soybean grain. We adjust this 
data from high grade soybean. 
b Export price is fob price of mixed grade soybean. 
c Import price is cif price of mixed grade soybean. 
d Farm price is the official-reported price received by the farmer of soybean (mixed). 
e Trade definition: X=Net export; M = Net Import; and N= Non-trade/Balanced Trade. 
 
Source:(1), (2) and (3) Office of Agricultural Economics, Ministry of Agriculture and 
Cooperatives.  
(4) and (5) FOA ,United Nations (UN). 
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Appendix Table A12: Import quotas for soybeans, Thailand, 1995 to 2005 
 
Soybean 
Quota Non  quota 

















1995  20 10,402  5 278,947  88.1  88.1 
1996  20 10,402  5 426,460  88.1  87.2 
1997  20  10,402  0 unlimited  88.1 86.3 
1998  20  10,402  0 unlimited  88.1 88.1 
1999  20  10,402  0 unlimited  88.1 88.1 
2000  20  10,402  0 unlimited  88.1 88.1 
2001  20  10,402  0 unlimited  88.1 88.1 
2002  20  10,806  0 unlimited  81.8 81.8 
2003  20  10,864  0 unlimited  80.9 80.9 
2004  20  10,922  0 unlimited  80.0 80.0 
2005  20  10,922  0 unlimited  80.0 80.0 
 
a the official figures in 1998-2001 are not available. To the best for our knowledge so far, there 
has not considerable change in these figures since 1997 so that we use the 1997 figure as the 
estimates. 
b Unlimited import quota (from 2002 onward) is allocated among 6 Associations and 6 food 
processors.     
1. Soybean and Rice Bran Oil Processor Association           
2. Thai Feed Mill Association           
3. Broiler Raiser for Exporting Association           
4. The Feedstuff Users Promotion Association           
5.  Thai  Livestock  Association     
6. Thai Broiler Processing Exporters  Association       
7. Thai Theparos Food Products Public Company Limited           
8.  Lactasoy  Company  Limited      
9. Green Spot (Thailand) Limited           
10. Dairy Plus Co. Ltd.           
11. Serm Suk YHS Beverage Co., Ltd. 
12. Korat Jeesae Partnership Limited 
 
Source: Department of Internal Trade, Ministry of Commerce   28
Appendix Table A13: Price comparisons and trade status for sugar,
a Thailand, 1060 to 2005 
 
Sugar : Nominal Price (Raw sugar basis) 
Year










1960 1,398  n.a
 c.  4,628 n.a.  X 
1961  1,952 n.a. 4,231 n.a.  X 
1962  1,161 3,413 3,450 3,810  X 
1963  2,648 3,251 4,752 4,900  X 
1964  3,222 3,236 5,394 5,140  X 
1965  1,184 2,690 2,453 2,540  X 
1966  1,651 2,410 2,784 3,050  X 
1967  2,176 2,384 3,650 3,480  X 
1968  2,054 2,919 4,178 4,030  X 
1969  2,369 2,630 3,662 3,560  X 
1970  1,708 2,115 2,730 2,880  X 
1971  2,182 2,229 3,108 3,520  X 
1972  3,263 2,545 3,452 4,210  X 
1973  4,306 3,043 4,176 4,110  X 
1974  8,762 3,309 5,515 4,420  X 
1975 10,676  4,721  6,597  4,470  X 
1976  6,069 4,808 5,595 5,220  X 
1977  4,647 4,528 4,677 4,760  X 
1978  3,818 5,150 4,212 5,020  X 
1979  4,025 5,603 4,679 5,590  X 
1980 6,499  6,315  8,631  10,110  X 
1981 6,932  8,023  9,191  10,190  X 
1982 5,841  7,949  6,540  10,720  X 
1983 4,037  6,119  5,833  10,910  X 
1984 4,194  6,421  6,829  10,960  X 
1985 3,330  6,069  6,452  10,970  X 
1986 3,610  6,133  6,571  10,980  X 
1987 4,190  6,714  7,521  10,970  X 
1988 5,120  8,216  9,539  10,980  X 
1989 6,420  8,500  9,421  10,988  X 
1990 7,293  10,221  11,360  10,988  X 
1991 5,127  8,200  9,619  10,988  X 
1992 4,991  8,532  9,024  10,990  X 
1993 5,570  9,314  9,769  10,990  X 
1994 6,430  10,076  10,174  10,989  X 
1995 7,395  9,956  10,675  10,995  X 
1996 6,690  10,084  11,367  10,997  X 
1997 7,090  11,162  11,556  10,997  X 
1998  11,234 19,242 14,622 11,100  X 
1999  5,842 11,263 8,880 10,993  X 
2000  5,863 11,849 8,632 11,415  X 
2001 9,368  15,470  12,558  11,763  X 
2002 6,414  13,994  10,014  11,754  X 
2003  6,890 11,598 9,830 11,762  X 
2004 6,248  8,498  8,827  11,761  X 
2005 8,560  11,994  11,637  11,750  X 
 
 
   29
a Since 1982, Thai Cane and Sugar Industry has adopted the 70:30 revenue sharing formula, i.e. 
70 percent of net revenue from selling cane products go to cane farmer and the rest go to sugar 
millers. 
b We use the end of plantation year as a proxy for the calendar year. For example, 1985/86 of 
plantation year is the 1986 calendar year. 
c n.a. is not available. 
d Trade definition: X=Net export; M = Net Import; and N= Non-trade/Balanced Trade. 
 
Source: 
The data during 1985-2005 are obtained from: 
(1) FOB price of raw sugar obtained from Office of the Cane and Sugar Board, Ministry of 
Industry. 
(2) It is represented by the ratio of sugar cane's price divided by the conversion/extraction ratio 
from sugar cane to raw sugar. Both data are obtained from Office of the Cane and Sugar Board, 
Ministry of Industry.   
(3) We use 1984 price from Siamwalla and Setboonsarng (1989) as the starting point and then 
adjust by annual growth calculated from annual change in remuneration for miller's production 
and selling. 
(4) The wholesale price of white sugar at Bangkok market is obtained from Office of 
Agricultural Economics, Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives. Note that the white sugar 
price is chosen because of updating the original series from Siamwalla and Setboonsarng (1989). 
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Appendix Table A14: Price comparisons and trade status for palmoil,
 a Thailand, 1961 to 2004 
 
























1961  6,997  0  n.a. n.a. n.a.  0  15   
1962  6,947  0  n.a. n.a. n.a.  0  33   
1963  6,450  0  n.a. n.a. n.a.  0  42   
1964  10,161  0  n.a. n.a. n.a.  0  41   
1965  8,101  0  n.a. n.a. n.a.  0  36   
1966  8,120  0  n.a. n.a. n.a.  0  46   
1967  6,644  0  n.a. n.a. n.a.  0  72   
1968  4,899  0  n.a. n.a. n.a.  0  183   
1969  5,980  0  n.a. n.a. n.a.  0  91   
1970  6,589  0  n.a. n.a. n.a.  0  54   
1971  6,342  0  n.a. n.a. n.a.  0  99   
1972  4,587  0  n.a. n.a. n.a.  0  146   
1973  9,406  0  n.a. n.a. n.a.  0  78   
1974  11,322  1,168  n.a. n.a. n.a.  178  18   
1975  12,698 624  n.a. n.a. n.a.  2,158  98   
1976  9,377 697  n.a. n.a. n.a.  2,073  7,046   
1977  10,317 386  n.a. n.a. n.a.  124  4,855   
1978  12,229 909  n.a. n.a. n.a.  2,668  6,406   
1979  14,131  98  n.a. n.a. n.a.  219  13,909   
1980  13,791  0 1,290 n.a. n.a.  0  58,703   
1981  12,200  0 1,240 n.a. n.a.  0  26,936   
1982  10,268 507 1,190 n.a. n.a.  231  9,203   
1983  9,922 839 1,430 n.a. n.a.  360  12,792   
1984  17,409  1,312 1,720 n.a. n.a.  4,741  7,572   
1985  20,968  1,239 1,510 n.a. n.a.  13,549  3,333   
1986  0 531 1,120 n.a. n.a.  4,587  0   
1987  0 655 2,290 n.a. n.a.  558  0   
1988  9,792  700  2,860 16,150 22,370  1  5,407   
1989  0  2,057  1,850 11,940 22,370  53  0   
1990  0  1,976  1,890 12,490 18,450  79  0   
1991  0  2,037  1,830 12,260 18,620  99  0   
1992  10,467  1,107  1,800 14,840 18,620  1,440  9,725   
1993  0  0  1,790 13,170 22,510  0  0   
1994  0  1,286  1,710 13,690 19,630  9,386  0   
1995  15,296  1,694  2,050 15,870 22,610  6,157  14,976   
1996  13,693  2,173  2,030 15,400 22,310  643  24,772   
1997  18,290  1,835  2,170 16,600 24,030  52,690  17,379   
1998  26,430  2,513  3,370 26,470 38,930  44,695  8,471   
1999  n.a.  1,348  2,210 18,990 30,670  24,329  n.a.   
2000  0  1,011  1,660 12,920 21,870  20,234  0   
2001  0  1,002  1,190 10,860 19,190  160,811  0   
2002  20,290  1,559  2,300 17,290 25,880  49,744  90   
2003  21,550  1,527  2,340 18,260 27,980  76,667  2   
2004  0  1,700  3,110 20,130 30,600  3,036  0   
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a We collected two series of domestic prices, the average wholesale prices of crude and refined 
palmoil. 
b Export price is fob price of palmoil (crude plus refined palmoil). 
c Import price is cif price of palmoil (crude plus refined palmoil). 
d Farm price is the official reported price that the farmer of oil palm fruits attaching to the bunch 
received. 
e Zero figures on import and export prices are because of a zero trade value. In the case of 
imports, official claime this was a result of import restrictions. 
f Trade definition: X=Net export; M = Net Import; and N= Non-trade/Balanced Trade. 
 
Source: (1), (4) and (5) Office of Agricultural Economics, Ministry of Agriculture and 
Cooperatives and FOA, United Nations (UN). 
(2) and (3) Office of Agricultural Economics, Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives. 
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Quota  Year 
tariff rate (%)  import quota (ton)
Non Quota
a (%) 
2000 20  4,757  147.8 
2001 20  4,809  146.2 
2002 20  4,834  144.6 
2003 20  4,860  143.0 
2004 20  4,860  143.0 
2005 20  4,860  143.0 
 
a Non quota percent means the ad valorem tariff rate for imports exceeding the quota. For 
example, suppose Thailand imports 6000 tons in 2005. The first 4860 tons are subject to the 20 
percent tariff rate and the rest (6,000-4,860= 1,140 tons) are subject to the 143 percent tariff rate. 
 
Source: Department of Internal Trade, Ministry of Commerce. 
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Appendix Table A16: Price comparisons and trade status for rubber, Thailand, 1960 to 2005 
 
Rubber : Nominal Price (Raw rubber sheet basis) 











1960 12,601  14,352  n.a.  X 
1961 9,336  10,649  n.a.  X 
1962 8,463  9,968  n.a.  X 
1963 7,891  9,286  n.a.  X 
1964 7,584  8,596  n.a.  X 
1965 7,930  8,588  n.a.  X 
1966 7,446  8,292  n.a.  X 
1967  5,851 6,555 5,100  X 
1968  6,237 6,304 5,490  X 
1969  7,995 8,745 6,940  X 
1970  6,580 7,197 5,720  X 
1971  5,295 5,292 4,740  X 
1972  5,300 4,968 4,770  X 
1973 9,680  10,834  6,860  X 
1974 9,553  13,024  7,380  X 
1975  8,310 9,589 6,420  X 
1976 10,841  13,358  9,150  X 
1977  11,756 14,512 10,190  X 
1978  13,850 17,368 12,210  X 
1979  17,520 22,780 14,680  X 
1980  18,940 26,377 16,350  X 
1981  14,840 22,320 13,400  X 
1982  13,430 16,574 12,420  X 
1983  17,750 20,252 16,080  X 
1984  16,447 21,315 15,070  X 
1985  15,820 18,716 14,820  X 
1986  16,630 19,030 15,610  X 
1987  18,930 22,440 18,000  X 
1988  23,810 27,550 21,980  X 
1989  19,940 22,885 17,840  X 
1990  18,326 19,661 17,150  X 
1991  17,550 19,265 16,350  X 
1992  18,060 19,139 16,870  X 
1993  17,118 19,198 16,050  X 
1994  23,910 25,478 22,110  X 
1995  34,470 36,273 31,890  X 
1996  34,718 34,226 28,660  X 
1997  27,040 31,148 23,290  X 
1998  25,730 26,227 23,060  X 
1999  19,800 21,869 18,050  X 
2000  23,200 24,799 21,520  X 
2001  22,530 23,020 20,760  X 
2002  29,130 28,733 27,570  X 
2003  40,140 39,959 37,660  X 
2004  46,240 49,215 44,130  X 
2005  55,180 57,130 53,570  X 
a Domestic and Farm prices are based on the grade 3 raw (unsmoked) rubber sheets.   34
b Border price is the fob of grade 3 raw (unsmoked) rubbers sheets.The export price of processed 
grade 3 (smoked) rubber sheets is converted to equivalent price of raw rubber sheets by 
subtracting average value added of smoked rubbers sheet price. 
c Trade definition: X=Net export; M = Net Import; and N= Non-trade/Balanced Trade. 
 
Source: (1) Bank of Thailand Quarterly Bulletin, Bank of Thailand. 
(2) and (3) Office of Agricultural Economics, Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives. 
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Appendix Table A17: Price comparisons and trade status for urea fertilizer,
 b Thailand, 1984 to 
2006 
 
Urea Fertilizer: Nominal Price (N-P-K formula is 46-0-0 ) 
Domestic price (baht/ton)  Year 
Border price
a 
(baht/ton)   Wholesale  Local / Retail 
Trade 
1984 4,745  5,417  5,887  M 
1985 4,050  5,409  6,197  M 
1986 2,791  3,358  4,265  M 
1987 2,612  3,500  3,862  M 
1988 3,551  4,408  4,657  M 
1989 3,539  4,533  4,971  M 
1990 3,525  4,633  4,985  M 
1991 3,783  4,625  5,180  M 
1992 4,041  4,617  5,375  M 
1993 3,356  4,167  5,098  M 
1994 3,790  4,379  4,900  M 
1995 5,756  6,554  7,200  M 
1996 5,795  6,354  7,090  M 
1997 5,327  5,833  6,954  M 
1998 5,409  6,788  7,770  M 
1999 3,962  5,017  5,832  M 
2000 5,289  6,069  6,369  M 
2001 5,691  6,336  7,139  M 
2002 5,260  6,238  6,719  M 
2003 6,832  7,008  7,593  M 
2004 8,060  8,700  9,148  M 
2005 11,007  11,729  12,349  M 
2006
 c 10,325  11,513  12,625  M 
 
a Border price means the cif price of urea fertilizer. 
b Thailand is an importer of urea fertilizer throughout the period shown. 
c The data in 2006 are based on the first four months of that year. 
 
Source: Office of Agricultural Economics, Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives. 
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Appendix Table A18: Nominal rate of assistance at the wholesale level, by agricultural commodity, 
and fertilizer consumer tax equivalent (CTE), Thailand, 1970 to 2005 
(percent) 
 
Year Rice Maize  Cassava Soybean Sugar  Rubber 
Fertilizer 
CTE  
1970  -40.1 -0.2  -8.6 -19.9 63.6 -4.0  8.5 
1971  -41.0 -1.1 -16.9  -19.9 45.8  5.1  8.5 
1972 -41.2  9.0  -23.2 -19.9  8.3  12.1  8.5 
1973  -37.6 -7.4 -17.3  -19.9 -0.7  -6.1  8.5 
1974 -62.5  0.0  -14.0 -19.9 -35.6 -22.9  8.5 
1975  -45.9 -4.1 -12.8  -19.9  -36.8 -9.0  8.5 
1976  -19.8 -0.8 -10.2  -19.9 -5.6 -14.7 8.5 
1977 -32.9  2.9  -15.6 -19.9  3.0  -14.9  8.5 
1978 -38.4  0.2  -11.6 -19.9  12.9  -16.2  8.5 
1979 -26.3  -2.1  5.9  -19.9  19.0  -19.2  8.5 
1980  -30.1 -3.0  -4.7 -19.9 35.9 -24.6 8.5 
1981  -35.6 -6.4 -22.0  -19.9 35.7 -30.2 8.5 
1982 -15.5  2.6  -10.1 -19.9  14.6  -14.9  8.5 
1983 -11.3  2.6  0.9  -19.9  47.9  -7.9  8.5 
1984 -14.7  2.6  -25.1 -19.9  66.6  -18.9  8.5 
1985  -20.8 -1.3 -20.3  -27.1 98.3 -11.2 27.0 
1986  -20.1  -10.8 -1.4 -20.9 86.3 -8.2 14.4 
1987  -11.7 -2.5 -17.0  -13.2 83.7 -11.4 27.4 
1988 -11.3  0.8  -14.4  -5.2  90.7  -9.2  18.0 
1989  -10.2 -1.0 -15.8  -10.0 50.2 -8.5 21.7 
1990 -9.7  1.3  -9.8 -47.4 59.4  -2.1 24.9 
1991 -10.4  0.1  -13.6 -15.6  92.0  -4.3  16.2 
1992 -10.2 -13.3  -9.5  47.0  85.0  -0.9  8.6 
1993 -19.0  4.6  -13.9  31.7  79.5  -6.3  18.0 
1994 -26.3  0.9  -2.2  37.2  61.9  -1.4  9.8 
1995 -6.6  10.1  1.3  31.1 47.8  -0.2  8.2 
1996 -7.7 -10.7 -8.6 33.3 73.9  6.6  4.2 
1997 -15.2 -42.8 -18.2  9.3  66.8  -8.8  4.1 
1998  -8.3 -4.8 -4.1 25.3 33.2 3.1 19.3 
1999  -8.2 -8.5 -4.4 52.3 55.6 -4.9 20.4 
2000 -9.5  2.8  -10.9 48.9 50.7  -1.7  9.1 
2001  -5.7 -0.9 -6.2 39.5 37.2 2.8  5.8 
2002 -4.1  0.0  4.4  44.8 59.8  6.5  12.7 
2003  -4.0 -0.1 -2.1 36.4 46.0 5.5 -2.5 
2004 -2.8  0.9  -2.9  29.1 44.6  -1.3  2.6 
2005  -2.9 -3.6 -2.9 24.9 39.1 1.5  1.3 
Source: Authors’ calculations.  37
Appendix Table A19: Nominal rate of assistance at the farm level, by agricultural commodity, 
excluding fertilizer subsidy,
a Thailand, 1970 to 2005 
(percent) 
 
Year Rice Maize  Cassava Soybean Sugar  Rubber 
1970 -23.9  -0.1  -9.1  -16.3  34.8  -4.2 
1971 -27.5  -0.9  -24.3 -16.3  32.0  5.7 
1972 -20.7  7.2  -31.5 -16.3  13.9  11.6 
1973 -19.9  -6.0  -38.4 -16.3  6.4  -4.6 
1974 -50.7  0.0  -6.9  -16.3 -15.2  -7.6 
1975 -38.2  -3.3  0.8  -16.3  -9.2  2.4 
1976 -19.3  -0.6  1.5  -16.3  -0.8  -2.1 
1977 -25.2  2.4  -8.7  -16.3  -0.5  -9.9 
1978 -29.7  0.2  -11.5 -16.3  4.0  -13.0 
1979  -22.9 -1.7 20.5 -16.3 -0.5 -17.2 
1980 -23.7  -2.4  -0.7  -16.3  7.4  -20.1 
1981 -27.9  -5.2  -20.1 -16.3  22.7  -26.8 
1982 -14.6  2.1  -5.9  -16.3  2.9  -13.4 
1983 -7.8  2.1  8.4  -16.3  9.1  -7.6 
1984 -10.4  2.1  -19.5 -16.3  30.0  -17.8 
1985 -16.5  -1.0  -25.1 -22.4  45.8  -11.0 
1986 -16.5  -8.8  2.5  -17.1  43.7  -9.3 
1987 -6.7  -2.0 -16.9 -10.7 43.1 -12.5 
1988 -6.9  0.7  -16.9 -4.1  46.2 -12.0 
1989 -13.5  -0.8  -9.5  -8.1  25.6  -10.6 
1990 -10.1  1.1  -6.6  -40.2  28.8  -1.0 
1991 -11.5  0.1  -13.0 -12.7  37.9  -5.2 
1992 -8.9 -10.9  -10.5 36.1 46.7  -1.1 
1993 -17.0  3.7  -13.5  24.6  40.5  -6.1 
1994 -22.3  0.8  2.4  28.8  30.9  -1.3 
1995 -8.3  8.1  4.1  24.2 22.6  -1.3 
1996 -1.1  -8.7 -17.9 25.9 38.1  2.2 
1997 -15.9 -36.4 -19.7  7.4  37.8  -3.1 
1998 -12.5  -3.9  -7.4  19.8  17.7  7.1 
1999 -8.0  -6.9 -18.6 40.0  5.3  -2.2 
2000 -11.6  2.2  -12.4  37.5  17.8  1.1 
2001 -7.9  -0.7  -6.7  30.5  8.7  2.9 
2002 -3.7  0.0  -3.2  34.5 14.4  7.1 
2003 -4.0  0.0  -13.8 28.2  8.1  2.2 
2004 -5.8  0.7  -9.5  22.7 18.3  -5.3 
2005 -1.7  -2.9  -9.5  19.5 33.1  -4.9 
a See text for explanation of estimation at the farm level.  
Source: Authors’ calculations.  38
Appendix Table A20: Nominal rate of assistance at the farm level, covered agricultural products 
including fertilizer subsidy,
a Thailand, 1970 to 2004 
(percent) 
 
  Rice  Maize Cassava Sugar Rubber Poultry Soybean Palmoil Pigmeat 
All 
covered 
1970 -26  -2  -10  33  -5  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  -5  -20 
1971 -29  -3  -25  30  5  -37  n.a.  n.a.  16  -24 
1972  -22 5 -33  12 11  -43 n.a.  n.a. -17 -23 
1973  -21  -8 -39 5  -5  -32 n.a.  n.a. -35 -22 
1974 -52  -2  -8  -17  -8  -19  n.a.  n.a.  18  -41 
1975 -40  -5  0  -11  2  30  n.a.  n.a.  -7  -28 
1976 -21  -3  0  -3  -3  24  n.a.  n.a.  -9  -12 
1977 -26  0  -10  -2  -11  3  n.a.  n.a.  19  -16 
1978  -31  -2 -13 2  -14  8 n.a.  n.a. -13 -22 
1979 -24  -4  19  -2  -18  15  n.a.  n.a.  19  -13 
1980 -25  -4  -2  6  -21  45  n.a.  -25  83  -12 
1981 -29  -7  -22  21  -28  12  n.a.  -33  60  -17 
1982 -16  0  -7  1  -14  34  n.a.  -20  19  -7 
1983 -9  0  7  7  -8  27  n.a.  -19  68  0 
1984 -12  0  -21  28  -19  16  -18  -31  29  -7 
1985 -20  -7  -29  41  -14  16  -27  -22  -5  -13 
1986 -18  -12  0  41  -11  -9  -20  12  -5  -11 
1987 -11  -9  -21  38  -15  -13  -16  68  3  -10 
1988 -9  -4  -20  43  -14  -13  -7  71  53  -5 
1989 -17  -6  -13  21  -13  -17  -12  32  58  -9 
1990 -14  -5  -11  24  -4  -5  -44  67  14  -7 
1991 -14  -4  -16  35  -7  -12  -16  39  -6  -8 
1992 -10  -13  -12  45  -2  -17  35  18  15  -4 
1993 -20  0  -17  37  -8  -10  21  22  -20  -10 
1994 -24  -1  1  29  -2  -11  27  -14  5  -9 
1995 -10  6  3  21  -2  17  22  -13  60  3 
1996 -2 -10  -19  37  2  18  25  -3  32  5 
1997 -17  -37  -20  37  -4  8  7  -18  3  -8 
1998 -16  -7  -11  14  4  23  17  -19  19  -4 
1999 -11  -10  -22  2  -6  23  37  -11  67  -1 
2000 -13  1  -14  16  -1  21  36  -11  -10  -3 
2001 -9  -2  -8  8  1  15  30  -38  -16  -3 
2002 -6  -2  -5  12  4  33  33  -9  21  5 
2003 -3  0  -13  9  3  13  28  -15  -3  1 
2004 -6  0  -10  18  -6  n.a.  22  n.a.  n.a.  -2 
 
a Nominal rate of assistance at farm level for that industry minus the product of the cost share of 
fertilizer for that industry and the consumer tax equivalent for fertilizer (Appendix Table A18); 
averaged using value of production at undistorted prices as weights (Appendix Table A23)  
Source: Authors’ calculations.    39
Appendix Table A21: Value shares of primary production of covered products at farmgate 
undistorted prices, Thailand, 1970 to 2005  
(percent) 
 





1970 44  4  3  1  3  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  4  60  40 
1971 40  4  3  1  3  9  n.a.  n.a.  3  63  37 
1972 39  2  6  1  3  9  n.a.  n.a.  4  65  35 
1973 43  5  4  2  4  7  n.a.  n.a.  5  69  31 
1974 50  4  1  2  2  4  n.a.  n.a.  2  66  34 
1975 47  5  2  3  2  3  n.a.  n.a.  3  65  35 
1976 39  4  4  5  3  3  n.a.  n.a.  3  63  37 
1977 38  2  6  7  4  5  n.a.  n.a.  3  64  36 
1978 42  3  4  3  4  4  n.a.  n.a.  4  66  34 
1979 39  4  5  6  7  4  n.a.  n.a.  3  67  33 
1980 41  4  7  3  6  3  n.a.  0  3  67  33 
1981 42  4  6  5  5  4  n.a.  0  3  68  32 
1982 35  4  7  8  5  4  n.a.  0  4  67  33 
1983 36  5  7  4  6  5  n.a.  0  3  67  33 
1984 35  6  8  4  6  4  1  1  4  68  32 
1985 34  6  6  3  7  4  1  1  5  67  33 
1986 30  5  7  2  10  6  2  0  5  67  33 
1987 28  3  10  3  11  6  1  1  5  69  31 
1988 36  5  7  3  13  6  2  1  3  75  25 
1989 38  5  6  4  11  6  2  1  3  76  24 
1990 29  4  7  5  11  7  3  1  5  72  28 
1991 30  4  7  4  9  9  1  1  6  72  28 
1992 27  4  6  4  11  11  1  1  6  71  29 
1993 24  3  5  4  12  11  1  1  7  69  31 
1994 29  4  4  4  14  9  1  2  6  73  27 
1995 28  4  5  5  18  8  1  2  4  75  25 
1996 28  5  5  4  16  9  1  2  6  76  24 
1997 31  6  4  4  12  9  1  2  7  76  24 
1998 36  4  5  4  10  9  1  3  4  75  25 
1999 33  5  4  6  10  10  1  2  4  75  25 
2000 31  5  3  6  13  10  1  2  6  77  23 
2001 27  4  4  5  12  12  0  2  9  75  25 
2002 27  4  4  5  16  11  0  3  6  76  24 
2003 25  4  4  6  21  10  0  3  6  80  20 
a At farmgate undistorted prices 
Source: Authors’ calculations.   40
Appendix Table A22: Nominal rates of assistance to all,
a tradables agricultural industries, to non-
agricultural industries, and relative rate of assistance,
b Thailand, 1970 to 2005 
(percent) 
Total ag NRA 
Covered products 














1970 -2  -18  -9  -15  -18  16  -29 
1971 -2  -22  -3  -16  -18  16  -30 
1972  -2  -21 -13 -19  -22 16  -33 
1973  -2  -20 -19 -21  -23 16  -34 
1974 -2  -39  -8  -30  -34  16  -43 
1975  -2  -26 -12 -23  -26 16  -36 
1976 -2  -10  -7  -10  -12  16  -24 
1977 -2  -14  0  -10  -12  16  -24 
1978  -2  -20 -12 -18  -21 16  -32 
1979 -2  -11  2  -8  -9  16  -22 
1980 -1  -11  21  -1  -1  16  -15 
1981 -1  -16  11  -8  -9  15  -21 
1982 -2  -5  3  -4  -4  14  -16 
1983 -1  1  18  6  7  13  -6 
1984 -1  -6  4  -3  -4  12  -14 
1985 -4  -9  -7  -11  -13  11  -22 
1986  -2  -9 -5 -9  -10  11  -19 
1987 -5  -5  0  -7  -8  11  -17 
1988 -3  -2  16  0  0  11  -10 
1989 -4  -5  13  -4  -4  11  -14 
1990 -4  -3  4  -4  -4  10  -13 
1991  -3  -5 -3 -7  -8  10  -16 
1992 -1  -3  4  -2  -2  10  -11 
1993  -3  -7 -7 -9  -10  10  -18 
1994  -2  -7 -2 -7  -8  10  -16 
1995 -1  4  18  7  7  9  -2 
1996 -1  6  11  6  7  9  -2 
1997  -1  -7 -2 -7  -8 9  -15 
1998 -3  -1  4  -2  -2  9  -10 
1999 -3  2  19  4  4  8  -4 
2000  -2  -1 -3 -3  -3 8  -11 
2001  -1  -2 -5 -4  -4 8  -11 
2002  -2  7 8 6  7  8  -1 
2003  0  1 0 0  0  8  -7 
2004 0  -2  7  -1  -1  8  -8 
 
a. NRAs including assistance to nontradables and non-product specific assistance.
 





t are the percentage NRAs for the tradables 
parts of the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors, respectively.  
Source: Authors’ calculations. 